

MEMORANDUM

In response to the letter of November 5, here are my reactions to the points raised in the Staff Memorandum enclosed. I need hardly say that these reactions are personal and do not reflect the views of the organization for which I work.

Question 1: I think the basic responsibilities are sufficiently defined so that able leadership in both departments could easily work out the division in any difficult case. The basic ground rules now seem to me near enough correct so that any change would be likely to be a mistake.

Question 2: even if change were desirable, I would strongly question any attempt to codify the responsibilities. Years of experience with such codifications in another area of the government lead me to doubt their efficacy and to fear excessively minute interpretation.

Question 3: I do not think State is giving adequate guidance to Defense on a great many matters, ranging from overall Budget size to area and country problems. Much of the difficulty is the attitude of the average Foreign Service officer, and his built-in feeling that Defense matters are not his to interfere with -- that Defense decisions are largely a "given" in any problem he has. To the extent that organization can remedy this, I would suggest a beefing up of the staff of the

Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, or conceivably of the Under Secretary, with an office or group specifically charged with overseeing State's relations with Defense. The model for such a group might be found in the UK Foreign Office group that functions under Sir Patrick Dean and keeps track of relations with the Ministry of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Dean's staff also oversees the Foreign Office role in the preparation of joint intelligence papers, comparable to our National Intelligence Estimates. I for one would tend to favor giving the US group this function as well, at some expense to the function of State's intelligence office, but perhaps this would be biting off too much at once.) In any case, the mission of this group should be to staff high-level contacts between State and Defense (minutes, follow-up action, etc.), to ensure the freest possible flow of low-level contacts on matters subject to such handling, and to move matters from a low to a high level as and when they require it. I have in mind a group of 3-6 working officers, predominantly on normal assignment within the Foreign Service, but including one or more permanent or continuing people (e.g., Charles Sullivan, now of State's AE office) to provide the necessary guidance as to the Pentagon and its changing situation. I don't think FSO's alone can do this job -- but on the other hand predominantly FSO staffing would be important for its acceptance within State and its usefulness in building up greater feel

for the State-Defense relationship throughout the Foreign Service.

Question 4: my impression is that not enough guidance does flow from Defense at early stages of problems. I don't know enough to be confident on the organization side, but think ISA has the necessary charter and, on the whole, remarkably good people both civilian and military. (Continuity of top civilians is, however, vital -- as the outstanding tenure of the late Frank Nash demonstrated.) ISA is, by and large, adequate as a reference point on most matters. The problem seems to be that it does not have anyone in State to tell of things at early stages -- hence the suggestion of a State group with much similar functions in the other direction.

Question 5:

a. I think a State man sitting with the Chiefs themselves would be too much for the Chiefs to swallow, and would be of doubtful efficacy unless the man were quite extraordinary. However, within the Joint Staff I would think that many exercises would benefit by the presence of a State man, by prior agreement. Suggest that such agreement should be routine business between the Director of the Joint Staff and the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, or whomever State sends to the "State-JCS" meeting.

b. Again too much to swallow -- and no use to attend meetings of the present Policy Planning Staff. I can't see a JCS or Defense man in the Secretary's staff meeting at State. The State staff proposed under Question 3 could well meet with ISA on some regular basis, but would also want its own private meetings.

c. My impression is that ISA's charter is now about right, but I don't know it well enough to be confident of this.

d. I doubt the efficacy of a permanent Planning Staff, tending so close to the NSC Planning Board. However, much business arising at the high-level "State-JCS" meeting of the present, or worked out by regular contacts between the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the head of ISA, and the Director of the Joint Staff could well be handed to task forces constituted for specific issues. In other words, it should be case-by-case. Most often, the issues would probably not be of a stature requiring reference to the NSC Planning Board -- where they were, let it be clear that I would favor such a pre-digesting of the issues, with added CIA participation in most cases, in effect reconstituting the onetime executive group of the NSC Planning Board (State-Defense-JCS-CIA) as it existed prior to 1953. But not as a standing committee, tho this may appear a fine line of distinction: Ad hoc people are much more zealous and effective than permanent reps who

sit on all manner of questions and have a way of diluting and fuzzing things.

e. Yes, at virtually every level. At the top, by close contact between the Secretaries (alumni of State in Defense, such as Lovett and Marshall, are too much to expect, but a close wire to State should be at the top of a Defense Secretary's agenda, and vice-versa). At the next level, through making the "State-JCS" meeting a really efficient group producing follow-up action. And down the line through contacts between ISA and the proposed State staff on a constant basis, and finally through Desk-Officer/ISA-section contact built up in part with the aid of the proposed State staff.

Question 6: I can see the logic of this, but recoil in horror at the Secretary's having to do any more testifying. With the military aid program now part of the DOD Budget, the Secretary may have to testify on this as he has done in the past when it was under the various aid organization Budgets. But I do not see the Secretary testifying on the adequacy of the aggregate defense budget to support our foreign policy objectives -- on the basic issue, his advice could only be in the form of generalities and in support of the Administration position. Nor do I think the Secretary should be formally charged with more responsibility on the Defense posture and Budget; if he is really on his job, he will

be heard forcefully within Administration councils, but in the last analysis the determination must be the President's, and it is a clear case where Congress should not try to say whom the President should consult. (As a lawyer, I have always doubted that the NSC law itself, if interpreted as a mandate to the President, was constitutional.)

Question 7: this is a tricky one. Permanent personnel of the staff proposed in my response to Question 3 would necessarily get a considerable "feel" for military matters, as would FSO's assigned to the Staff, to a lesser extent. But I much doubt having any additional group tagged as military experts. Hopefully, my proposed Staff would do a lot of educating. On the science side, I don't know enough to have a useful view -- my impression is that you would have great trouble getting a good enough man to be useful in the necessarily episodic work of a scientific advisor to State. For issues where science is at the core, as in disarmament, State has found what seems a pretty workable answer in giving the problem to the AE office and having a very small number of educated or educable people get into it.

Question 8: no (a thousand times no) as a separate "Secretary." Yes, as an Ambassador at Large, on the Norman Davis-Philip Jessup model.

Question 9: strongly query adding special assistants to the Secretary. Even the Erskine office seems questionable to me. Rather fill any existing gaps by adding to the ISA charter, perhaps raising the head of ISA a notch higher than the Assistant Secretaries, for example as a Deputy Under Secretary.

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